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Non-technical summary 
 
Both M&A and innovation are instruments for growth and competitive advantage. Therefore 
they are fundamental to each firm’s competitive strategy. Usually, both instruments have been 
studied separately, but much less in conjunction. This is unfortunate as both processes - the 
process of innovation and the process of mergers and acquisitions - are intimately connected. 
The impact of mergers on innovation can only be rigorously assessed, if the converse 
direction of influence - mergers caused by innovation - is accounted for. Therefore this review 
tries to take a balanced view on both processes and to point out links between them. 
Nevertheless, the focus is on the impact of mergers on innovation. 
 
Potentially, mergers can change almost every determinant of innovation incentives which may 
be relevant either for the merged entity or the remaining firms or both. This 
multidimensionality of the paths of impact via the many determinants poses a formidable 
problem to any analysis of the merger-innovation connection. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the literature has not yet reached a unified and sound background for judging the effects 
of mergers on innovation.  
 
In section 1, the few studies which analyze the impact of mergers on innovation directly are 
summarized. It is apparent from these studies that at an aggregate level the impact of M&A on 
innovation is negligible or negative. On the other hand, the reviewed research reveals also that 
a more disaggregated strategy and one which accounts for endogeneity shows patterns that are 
in contradiction to the aggregate view. There is evidence that innovation improves due to a 
merger. The presumption that mergers are detrimental to innovation seems not to be generally 
true and the case for positive impacts is very dispersed among some aspects of the merging 
entities, some relating to the technology level, some to its size, some to the level of financial 
distress, some to the strategic or organizational fit etc. Moreover, measures of innovation are 
different across the studies, econometric methodology is different, and some use case studies 
based on surveys with a correspondingly small sample size. It is hard to draw any general 
conclusion aside from the fact that heterogeneity matters and should be accounted for in 
empirical work, a view which is supported by one of the two theoretical contributions. 
 
In sections 2 and 3 the innovation process and the merger process are taken up respectively in 
order to inform the debate from these two angles in isolation. 
 
The relevant contributions reviewed in section 2 report on the relation of product market 
intensity and innovation. A merger will typically (but not necessarily) reduce the intensity of 
competition. From the theoretical perspective the main conclusion points to the wealth of 
potential causal relationships of competitive intensity on innovation. Many fundamental 
forces are identified which help to explain the ambiguous findings of the empirical literature. 
It is found that e.g. the distinction between process and product innovation matters and that 
the validity of some versions of the Schumpeter hypotheses depend on this distinction. 
 
Next, in section 3, we will review the literature on mergers and acquisitions. This literature is 
concerned with the impact of a merger in the first place but also – especially in its empirical 
part – with the causes of mergers. As innovative processes may be one of such a cause this 
information should be helpful to understand the merger-innovation link. An important aspect 
of this literature stresses the importance of taking account of the reaction patterns of the 
merger outsiders. This has important implications on the empirical literature which has 
usually ignored this impact.  
 
 
 Section 4 gathers some supplementary aspects. Some mergers are motivated by its potential to 
obtain access to patents or licenses and some mergers are cleared on the condition to provide 
licenses to rival firms. Therefore the literature on the incentives to offer licenses is also 
reviewed. The numerous contributions to the effect of spillovers of R&D have also a bearing 
on the merger-innovation link. Although most of this literature is on the effect of research 
joint ventures, it discusses the internalization of external effects. The literature on corporate 
finance stresses the impact of leverage on innovative activity. As mergers are often 
accompanied with increased financial leverage – especially in leveraged buy outs – this 
literature is included as well. Most of these strands of literature ignore the fact that a merger 
may affect the ability of the related firms to innovate. This is the main issue of the technology 
management literature which concentrates on the conditions for realizing technological 
synergies. Hence it will also be included. Finally, we offer some thoughts on the notions of 
technological opportunity and appropriability as a means to explain industry specific shocks. 
Given that this literature is motivated by quite different questions it is not surprising that it 
does not provide hard advice to the inquiry at hand. Rather it points to different dimensions 
and does not deliver unambiguous results. 
 
The review ends with some summarizing remarks in section 5. The main conclusion points at 
the need of more elaborate empirical and theoretical studies with a focus on particular 
industries. From what is known to date generalizing principles cannot be drawn with 
sufficient rigour. 
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Both M&A and innovation are instruments for growth and competitive advantage. Therefore 
they are fundamental to each firm’s competitive strategy. Usually, both instruments have been 
studied separately, but much less in conjunction. This is unfortunate as both processes - the 
process of innovation and the process of mergers and acquisitions - are intimately connected. 
The impact of mergers on innovation can only be rigorously assessed, if the converse 
direction of influence - mergers caused by innovation - is accounted for. Therefore this review 
tries to take a balanced view on both processes and to point out links between them. 
Nevertheless, the focus is on the impact of mergers on innovation. 
 
Although innovation is a highly complex matter, the question as to the impact of mergers on 
innovation boils down to the simple basic question: How do mergers change the incentives to 
innovate for the merging parties and for the remaining firms in the industry? It is therefore 
important to analyze determinants of these incentives. 
 
One of these determinants is the appropriability of the benefits of an innovation. The 
appropriability in turn depends on a host of circumstances. Among them the available 
institutional framework of intellectual property rights, the probable degree of knowledge 
spillovers, and the intensity of product market competition figure prominently. 
 
Another determinant is the ability to successfully engage in an innovation project. The ability 
again is in turn dependent on many aspects: the ability to finance the innovation project, the 
access to the use of intellectual property rights necessary for implementing the innovation, the 
absorptive capacity necessary to enter the innovation project successfully, which may be 
dependent on the distance to the current technological frontier, the availability of relevant 
human capital either internally or on the job market, the relationship to public research 
facilities etc. 
 
Potentially, mergers can change almost every determinant of innovation incentives which may 
be relevant either for the merged entity or the remaining firms or both. This 
multidimensionality of the paths of impact via the many determinants poses a formidable 
problem to any analysis of the merger-innovation connection. The complexity of the task is 
even larger because the determinants enumerated so far do only represent broad categories of 
which each exhibits a number of dimensions by itself and because the impact of mergers on 
innovation incentives can go in opposite directions for different determinants. For example, a 
merger may increase the ability of a merged entity in terms of increased knowledge, but may 
deter rivals from continuing an otherwise promising innovation project leading to a similar 
new product. It is obviously not clear whether the incentive to realize the merging firms’ 
project is increased by a merger or not.  
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the literature has not reached a unified and sound 
background for judging the effects of mergers on innovation. Indeed, there are only very few 
contributions dealing directly with the merger-innovation connection. But there are 
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substantially more contributions on the correlates of innovation like the size of a firm, the 
intensity of competition in the product market etc. As these have some bearing on the subject 
of our inquiry they are also surveyed in the following.  
 
The review will be structured as follows. First, in section 1, we will review the few studies 
which analyze the impact of mergers on innovation directly. Then, in section 2 we will collect 
the relevant contributions on the relation of product market intensity and innovation. A 
merger will typically (but not necessarily) reduce the intensity of competition. Therefore this 
relation is obviously important to assess the probable impact of a merger on innovation. 
Moreover, merger control is currently driven by a judgment as to whether a merger would 
lessen competition or not. Therefore the relation between competition and innovation is also 
important from this perspective. 
 
Next, in section 3, we will review the literature on mergers and acquisitions. This literature is 
concerned with the impact of a merger in the first place but also – especially in its empirical 
part – with the causes of mergers. As innovative processes may be one of such a cause this 
information should be helpful to understand the merger-innovation link.  
 
Section 4 gathers some supplementary aspects. Some mergers are motivated by its potential to 
obtain access to patents or licenses and some mergers are cleared on the condition to provide 
licenses to rival firms. Therefore we also review the literature on the incentives to offer 
licenses. The numerous contributions to the effect of spillovers of R&D have also a bearing 
on the merger-innovation link. Although most of this literature is on the effect of research 
joint ventures, it discusses the internalization of external effects. The literature on corporate 
finance stresses the impact of leverage on innovative activity. As mergers are often 
accompanied with increased financial leverage – especially in leveraged buy outs – this 
literature is included as well. Most of these strands of literature ignore the fact that a merger 
may affect the ability of the related firms to innovate. This is the main issue of the technology 
management literature which concentrates on the conditions for realizing technological 
synergies. Hence it will also be included. Finally, we offer some thoughts on the notions of 
technological opportunity and appropriability as a means to explain industry specific shocks. 
Generally for each of these strands of literature, we will first review theoretical studies (if 
existent) and then empirical contributions (if existent). 
 
The review ends with some summarizing remarks in section 5. 
 
1. Studies focusing on the link of mergers and innovation 
 
At the beginning of 2006 an extensive search of the exiting literature has not revealed a single 
theoretical contribution that deals directly with the subject of this section. This finding is in 
accordance with Cassiman et al. (2005) who claim this fact as well. In the meantime two 
theoretical studies appeared which will be reviewed next. But there are also some empirical 
contributions. First we present some of these studies which do not consider a specialized 
industry but rather use data covering many industries. At the end of this section we review 
some studies which are concerned with one industry. Studies are only included if they focus 
on merger specific changes in innovation behaviour.  
 
Kleer (2006) and Jost and van der Velden (2006) analyze the impact of mergers on innovative 
activity. The former study focuses on incremental process innovation while the latter deals 
with a patent race context stressing drastic innovation. As the results are more or less in line 
with each other and Kleer’s analysis is more elaborate I focus on his study. In a context which 
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abstracts from the organizational problems of a merger he finds that a merger increases the 
incentives for innovative activity of the merging parties. But depending on the strength of 
these merged entity rivals increase (low strength) or decrease (substantial strength) their 
innovative activity. Once, organizational problems of a merger are accounted for, even the 
clear picture of increased incentives for the merging parties disappears. Interestingly he finds 
that for most cases social surplus increases due to merger. This last result may be dependent 
on the specification of demand and cost structures. It should also be noted that his modelling 
strategy is essentially static.  
 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) suggests a negative impact of mergers on R&D. They analyze 
2955 US lines of business and acquisitions for the period of 1950-1977 and compare R&D of 
acquirers to R&D of the industry average for the period 1974-1977. Their indicator for R&D 
was R&D intensity (R&D spending/sales).  
 
Similarly Hall (1990) studies a sample of 2500 US manufacturing firms (1967-1987) and 
finds evidence of a very weak negative impact of R&D intensity. M&A which led to 
increased financial leverage decrease R&D intensity substantially and significantly. In Hall 
(1999) she revisits the issue on a new sample of about 6000 firms for the period 1976-1995. 
Identifying acquisitions which perform R&D before and after the acquisition leaves her with 
479 M&A cases. In contrast to the 1990 paper she estimates a propensity score for firms to be 
an acquirer and uses this score to stratify the sample. The propensity to be an acquirer is 
estimated as function of size (employment), R&D, cash flow, capital intensity and Tobin’s Q. 
Comparing firms with a similar propensity score which did acquire to those who didn’t 
reveals that for high propensity scores mergers have a positive impact on R&D intensity and 
growth. In contrast for those with a low propensity score the impact is reversed. Thus the 
earlier finding of almost no impact obscures the heterogeneity among firms. 
 
Hitt et al. (1991) use a sample of 191 US M&A for the period 1970-1986 and analyze R&D 
intensity and innovation output as measured by the number of patents divided by sales. 
Compared to the industry average, firms show lower innovation activity on both counts after 
going through a M&A process. Hitt et al. (1996) use another sample of 250 US firms for the 
period 1985-1991 to study among other influences the impact of M&A on innovation. The 
innovation measure is R&D intensity and the intensity of new products introduced (number of 
product introductions divided by sales). Both measures are combined via a factor analysis. 
They suggest a number of hypotheses. We report only on those which are relevant to 
innovation. One hypothesis holds that acquisition intensity (number of acquisitions) reduces 
internal innovation. A second holds that acquisitions lead to a shift from strategic controls to 
financial controls. This shift has an indirect negative impact on internal innovation. All of 
these hypotheses are supported by the econometric results.  
 
Capron (1999) studies the long-term performance of horizontal acquisitions. As in Hitt et al. 
(1996) the scope of the paper is much broader than on the innovation impact. His sample 
consists of 253 US and European acquirers in manufacturing industries and is based on a 
survey of managers of the acquiring firms. These were asked to reply on a 5 point scale on the 
change of capability for product innovation and on the change of the development design 
cycle (time to market). They report mixed effects of M&A on innovation capabilities. Firms 
redeployed assets from acquirer to target and vice versa to a large extent. This effect had a 
positive effect on innovation capabilities. On the other hand acquisitions also led to a 
substantial divesture of the target’s assets which had a negative effect on innovation 
capabilities. 50% of the M&A are reported to have improved these abilities. 
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Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) analyze the impact of mergers on innovation in OECD countries 
for the period 1990-1999. In contrast to the above contributions they use data on the industry 
level. They look at the R&D intensity (spending divided by production level) of an industry. 
One explanatory variable is the number of M&A in a given industry. Other control variables 
are included. On the aggregated level they find no significant impact of mergers on 
innovation. However they distinguish low-, medium-, and high-technology industries. 
Moreover they distinguish between domestic and cross-border M&A and analyze the impact 
on R&D for inward and outward mergers. They find that M&A had a positive impact in low-
technology intensive industries and that this is concentrated on domestic mergers. In medium- 
and high-technology industries domestic mergers reduced R&D investments, while cross-
border mergers have the opposite effect. Finally it is the target firms which profit from cross-
border mergers and not the acquiring firms in terms of R&D investments. 
 
Cassiman et al. (2005) analyze the effect of M&A on the R&D process concentrating on the 
role of technological- and market-relatedness. Their study is based on 31 in-depth cases of 
individual merger deals. All data originate from a survey of the managers of the firms. R&D 
measures include change of inputs (personnel, laboratories etc.), outputs (greater speed of 
developing technological knowledge, more patents, etc.), and performance (more productive 
R&D personnel, increase of returns on R&D, etc.) due to the merger. Their findings can be 
summarized as follows. M&A partners with complementary technologies result in more R&D 
activities, while for partners with substitutive technologies the reverse is true. The efficiency 
of R&D is also increased with complementary technologies. When partners were active in the 
same technological field the reduction of R&D is more prominent. Finally the gain in 
efficiency of R&D is smaller if the partners were rivals in the product market than if they 
were not. 
 
Ahuja and Katila (2001) consider a sample of 72 large firms of the chemicals industry in 
Europe, America and Japan for the period 1980-1991. Innovation is measured as the number 
of USPTO based patents obtained 1 to 4 years after the acquisition by the acquiring firm. 
They distinguish technological acquisitions from non-technological acquisitions and find that 
the latter do not have a significant impact on their innovation measure. For the technological 
acquisitions they find that the absolute size of the knowledge base of the target has a positive 
impact on innovation, the relative size of the knowledge base of the target has a negative 
impact on innovation and the relatedness of the knowledge bases of both firms have an 
inverse-U shape. The size of the knowledge base is measured by the patents held or cited by 
the respective firm 5 years before the acquisition. The relative knowledge base is the target’s 
base divided by the acquirer’s base. Relatedness is constructed from similar patents. Cloodt et 
al. (2006) confirm these results for OECD-dataset on high-tech industries with only minor 
modifications. 
 
Danzon et al. (2004) analyze the post-merger performance of the pharmaceutical industry on 
the firm level for the period 1988-2000. They are not explicit about the international 
composition of their sample (383 firms) but claim that it is US biased. They split the sample 
into large and small firms. As in Hall (1999) they first estimate propensity scores for being 
involved in a merger. They find that large firm mergers are connected to expiring drug 
patents, while small firms propensity to be involved in a merger (target) is connected to 
financial distress. The impact of mergers on R&D is only one of their performance indicators. 
R&D is measured as R&D investments. Controlling for the propensity score large firms that 
merged did not show significantly different R&D activities up to 3 years after the merger 
compared to firms that did not merge. In general small firms exhibited lower R&D investment 
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growth if they merged. Only small firms with a very high propensity score witnessed an 
higher R&D activity. 
 
Frey and Hussinger (2006) concentrate on the probability of being a merger target depending 
on the innovative performance of the firm. Hence, here it is not the impact of a merger on 
innovation, but on the contrary the impact of innovative performance on being involved in a 
merger as a target. They find that the stock of patents has a negative impact on this probability 
and cross-border dummy has also a negative impact, but the interaction term of the technical 
proximity (closeness of patent portfolios) with the cross-border dummy triggers a positive 
impact, while the same interaction term for domestic mergers does not. As some firms engage 
in innovation in order to be acquired the causality of this relationship, however, is not clear 
and I did not find a discussion of this potential problem in this work (as in many others’ 
work). In a related framework Ali-Yrkkö (2006) focuses on the quality of patents (measured 
by forward and backward citations) as an inducement to acquire a firm holding such patents. 
The author does not find significant effects from the quality of patents in his analysis of 
Finish acquisitions, but reports (also referring to earlier work of the author) that patents are 
positively correlated with acquisition by a foreign firm, while there is no such effect for 
domestic acquisitions. While this is consistent with Frey and Hussinger as both stress the 
technological justification of foreign acquisitions (as opposed to domestic ones), the impact of 
the number of patents diverge in both studies. 
 
An example of the opposite focus (does innovation activity of a firm trigger the active 
acquisition of other firms?) is the paper by Blonigen and Taylor (2000). They find that 
acquiring firms in their data on firms in the US electronic and electrical equipment industry 
from 1985 to 1993 are typically firms with low R&D intensity. These authors control for 
some variables indicating the financial performance and account for simultaneity problems. 
This suggests together with the results of the preceding paragraphs that acquiring firms look 
for targets with an attractive innovation portfolio. 
 
It is apparent from these studies that at an aggregate level the impact of M&A on innovation 
is negligible or negative. On the other hand, the reviewed research reveals also that a more 
disaggregated strategy and one which accounts for endogeneity shows patterns that are in 
contradiction to the aggregate view. There is evidence that innovation improves due to a 
merger. Obviously, this state of the art is not suitable to inform a merger review process. The 
presumption that mergers are detrimental to innovation seems not to be generally true and the 
case for positive impacts is very dispersed among some aspects of the merging entities, some 
relating to the technology level, some to its size, some to the level of financial distress, some 
to the strategic or organizational fit etc. Moreover, measures of innovation are different across 
the studies, econometric methodology is different, and some use case studies based on surveys 
with a correspondingly small sample size.  
 
It should also be noted that the dimensions of appropriability and ability are not fully covered 
by the above studies. In some cases mergers end a patent dispute. This improves the 
appropriability and the innovation potential of a firm. Knowledge spillovers may be 
concentrated in merging parties before the merger. Again, a merger improves appropriability 
and innovation potential. A merger may involve 2 partners which before the merger were 
intense competitors to each other. Thus a merger would change the intensity of product 
market competition. Again, appropriability would be improved with a positive impact on 
innovation. Similar examples could be found on the ability side. All of these instances might 
be difficult to pin down empirically due to data availability. It is nevertheless striking that 
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these considerations which are central parts of the innovation or merger literature – although 
not simultaneously – do not shine up in the above studies. 
 
Aside from the theoretical contributions (which however is ambiguous in its results at the 
present state of the art) the reviewed research also neglects the impact of mergers on the 
remaining competitors completely. If R&D belongs to the class of strategic substitutes, 
competitors will change their R&D levels downward (upwards) if the merged entity increases 
(decreases) R&D post-merger. The point is that comparing the R&D activities of the merged 
entity to those of the remaining competitors does not measure accurately what would have 
happened without the merger. But this is the important question for merger control. In such 
proceedings it will be important to know how competitors (actual or potential) are affected by 
the merger. This leaves quite a problem for a potential use of studies with a research design 
like those reviewed in the merger review. It should be noted that in these studies it is never 
claimed that they could be used in such a context. They set out to enquire into different types 
of questions which are more oriented towards management. But in a merger control context 
we are left with a clear deficit in understanding the complete impact on innovation.  
 
2. Innovation and Product Market Competition 
 
As has been noted in the introduction the literature dealing with the link between product 
market competition and innovation should be able to provide useful information on the 
merger-innovation connection. Unfortunately, neither theoretical nor empirical analysis 
provides a clear view on this topic. Neither the position according to which competition 
hinders innovation (often attributed to Schumpeter) nor the position according to which 
competition spurs innovation (often attributed to Arrow) receives unambiguous support. This 
is not to say that we have no relevant theory on this issue but that different modelling 
strategies lead to widely differing conclusions. As these strategies reflect different settings in 
different real circumstances one conclusion which can be drawn from this state of affairs is: 
The impact of the intensity of product market competition on innovation is quite different in 
different contexts. This section reviews some contributions to substantiate this view. It is 
helpful to structure it into three parts. The first two deal with theoretical contributions and the 
third with empirical studies. The theoretical parts are concerned with nonexclusive IP rights 
and with exclusive IP rights respectively (Gilbert (2006)). 
 
2.1 Nonexclusive IP rights 
 
The term “nonexclusive IP rights” should be interpreted with caution. The situation captured 
with this notion is one in which several firms may engage in innovative activities and the 
result is not of the “winner takes all” type. Rather all firms can protect their innovative 
success by trade secrets or by patents which do not infringe on each other. Hence, the success 
of one firm does not exclude another firm from using its own innovation. Gilbert (2006) 
argues that this may be the typical set up for process innovations.  
 
Indeed the respective voluminous literature models process innovation (in the form of 
reducing marginal costs). Most of it considers a symmetric and static setting, i.e. the cost 
functions and demand systems are identical across firms a priori but may be changed by 
innovation and there is no time dimension. This is certainly inadequate to capture real life 
situations but is helpful to expose the relevant forces. Drawing from overviews on this 
literature by Belleflamme and Vergari (2006), Gilbert (2006) and Vives (2006) there is no 
clear positive or negative relationship between the intensity of product market competition 
and innovation even in this restricted modelling context. The results depend very much on the 
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fact whether entry is easy or not and on the way in which the intensity of competition is 
measured. This intensity could be measured by the number of competitors, the ease of entry, 
or the degree of substitutability of products (Vives (2006)). Under most circumstances a 
higher degree of substitutability (higher intensity of competition) leads to higher innovative 
efforts by each firm. Again under most circumstances higher number of competitors reduces 
the innovative efforts by each firm independently of whether this number is changed in a 
comparative statics sense or due to a decrease in entry costs. The effects at work are the 
following. The incentive to engage in innovative activities in cost reducing innovations is on 
the one hand proportional to the output to which it can be applied. A higher number of 
competitors reduce this output and hence this incentive is diminished. On the other hand 
lower cost due to innovation decreases prices which boosts demand. In general terms these 
opposing forces may lead to ambiguous results. The term “under most circumstances” means 
in this context that the usual specifications of demand imply a dominance of the “output 
effect” (Vives (2006)).  
 
Note that the fact that innovative efforts per firm decrease with the number of competitors 
does not imply that aggregate efforts will decrease as well. Indeed the path breaking analysis 
of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) suggests otherwise. This provides an important caveat for using 
R&D inputs as a measure for innovative performance. In this context a large number of firms 
leads to larger aggregate R&D expenditures, but the costs (the innovative result) are higher. 
From a social point of view it would be preferable if only one firm would perform the 
innovation and then let the other firms use it. In short: larger innovative efforts are not welfare 
improving per se. 
 
Product innovations enter the picture only very artificially in terms of more competitors each 
providing one variant of a product. As Gilbert (2006) points out portfolio effects of products 
should play an important role which is hard to capture in a symmetric modelling approach. 
The punch line of this literature is thus: under the usual circumstances “nonexclusive” 
process-innovations are hampered by competition in the product market, if measured by the 
number of rivals. But the reverse is true if the intensity of competition is measured by the 
degree of substitutability.  
 
These studies suggest that the relationship between innovative and competitive activity is 
monotonically increasing or decreasing depending on our measure of competitiveness. 
Schmidt (1997) presents a model which can generate in inverse U-shaped relationship. He 
departs from the setup used in the above studies in that firms are lead by managers (not by the 
owners), that the result of innovative efforts is not certain, and that firms may go bankrupt 
which imposes a substantial loss on the managers. An increase of the intensity of competition 
is modelled by the change of a parameter which decreases profits cet. par. In this framework 
an increase in competitive vigour (take more rivals as an example) has two effects. Firstly, the 
demand reducing effect of more rivals reduces the incentive for managers to innovate (as in 
the above studies). Secondly, the increased number of rivals increases the probability of going 
bankrupt. As managers strive to escape from this potential result the incentive to innovate 
(reduce costs) is increased. Schmidt shows that these opposing forces generate an inverse U-
shaped relationship between innovation and competition, if the product market is a 
homogenous Bertrand market.  
 
It is obvious that the static nature of these studies cannot fully capture the process of 
innovation in a dynamic way where some firms may be technologically ahead of their rivals. 
The analysis by Aghion et al. (2005) is of a dynamic nature and also shows that there might 
be an inverse-U shaped relation between product market competition and innovation. They set 
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up a step by step innovation model in the sense that innovations come in successive steps 
where each firm can only make the next step after completing the last step. In each period 
firms can influence the probability of completing the step by R&D expenditures. Although the 
step structure can be quite general in principle (cp. Aghion et al, (2001)) firms and the R&D 
process are modelled in this paper such that firms in one “sector” can be only one step apart. 
As this study is in the tradition of growth theory, “sector” is understood in the macroeconomic 
sense. But it seems justified to conjecture that the model could also be applied to an industry 
with some sub sectors. Each sector contains 2 firms that compete in the product market. Given 
the assumptions on the R&D process there are always two regimes possible: Both firms have 
completed the same step. In this case the firms compete “neck-to-neck”. Or one firm lags one 
step behind the other (the “laggard regime”).  
 
The intensity of competition is measured by a parameter which could reflect the degree of 
substitutability. This intensity has different impacts in both regimes. If it is high a laggard has 
not much to gain (Schumpeter) and hence there will not be much innovation effort in a 
laggard regime. But starting from a neck-to-neck regime, firms have much to win (i.e., escape 
the competition). Therefore with high intensity of competition neck-to-neck sectors will have 
the stronger incentives to invest in R&D. For similar reasons the reverse holds true, if the 
intensity of competition is low. Given the stochastic nature of innovation, sectors will move 
stochastically from regime to the other. Suppose now that the intensity is low. As we have 
seen, laggards have a strong incentive to innovate while neck-to-neck firms have not. This 
implies that firms will be most of the time in the neck-to-neck regime. Hence an increase in 
competition increases the incentive to innovate for such firms. On the other hand, if 
competition is high to begin with the sector will be in the laggard regime for similar reasons 
as above. Hence an increase in competition will decrease the innovative effort. This provides 
the basic intuition to the result. It should be noted that even in this restricted model one 
(Schumpeter) or the other effect (escape the competition) may dominate for all parameter 
values. Hence there is no guarantee for an inverse-U shape but there may be a monotonically 
increasing or decreasing relation. However, this occurs for entirely different reasons 
compared to the analysis of Schmidt (1997). The main virtue of Aghion et al.’s modelling 
approach lies in the joint consideration of both effects. It highlights under what circumstances 
one effect may be more likely.  
 
Another recent contribution is due to Hörner (2004). He presents a model which looks similar 
to the basic setup of Aghion et al. (2005) in that firms proceed step by step in their perpetual 
technological endeavours. There, one firm may be an arbitrary number of steps ahead or 
behind. Unfortunately, the author does not model product market competition. Therefore his 
results cannot be easily related to the Aghion et al. paper. It is worth noting, however, that 
they display a wide variety of different equilibrium structures of investments in R&D. R&D 
efforts may be particularly high, if both firms are neck-to-neck. For other parameter 
constellations a firm’s efforts may be particularly high, if it is sufficiently far ahead. But this 
does not compare easily with the preceding paper. Indeed, the latter case is ruled out there. 
Therefore Hörner’s contribution tells us that an analysis à la Aghion et al. (2005) leaves out 
some aspects which may alter the message of their paper.  
 
In summary, this section has shown that there are no robust and unambiguous theoretical 
results on the relationship between the intensity of competition and innovation, despite the 
fact that many aspects of reality have been excluded a priori. Therefore, in different empirical 
situations different results should be expected. This finding favours in depth analysis of one 
sector rather than overall cross section studies. It has also shown that this relationship may not 
be monotonic. Indeed there are some good reasons - derived from economic theory - to 
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believe that this is probably the case. Finally, we have seen that more innovative activity is 
not necessarily welfare improving. 
 
2.2 Exclusive IP rights 
 
In contrast to the preceding section, here IP rights – like patents - prevent other firms from 
using an innovative technology of the inventor and there is no easy way to invent around. 
Most of the literature in this strand assumes that IP rights protection last forever. This 
assumption is of course unrealistic for most real life situations. But it helps again to identify 
essential forces working on the incentive to innovate. 
 
In his seminal paper Arrow (1962) exposes one of these forces: the replacement effect as it 
was termed by Tirole (1989) or “profit effect” by others. He compares two situations. In the 
first one an unchallenged monopolist considers a cost reducing innovation. In the second 
situation one firm under perfect competition considers the same innovation. As the incentive 
is measured by the difference in profit that a firm can earn if it invests in R&D compared to 
what it could earn without such an investment, it follows that the competitive situation 
provides higher incentives. This becomes particularly clear if a drastic innovation is 
considered. A drastic innovation decreases costs to such an extent that the monopoly price 
with these lower cost is below the higher status quo costs. Hence the ex post profits are the 
same for both situations but the ex ante profits are higher for the monopolist compared to the 
firm under perfect competition. Therefore the incentive of the latter is larger. In this simple 
framework the result also holds for innovations which are not drastic. The monopolist 
replaces an already high level of profits by an even higher one, while the competitive firm 
replaces a low profit by a substantially higher one. 
 
This result is of course vulnerable to changes in the underlying assumptions. So far the 
competitive situation is modelled in a homogenous commodity context under perfect 
competition. In an oligopolistic market with product differentiation the result would not hold 
in general and the monopolist may have the larger incentive. The conclusions also do not 
carry over to product innovations in any general sense. A monopolist may sell his old and the 
new product and use both to segment his customers. A firm under perfect competition may 
make only a positive profit with his new product. Hence it is easily conceivable that the 
monopolist has the larger incentive. Greenstein and Ramey (1998) provide an example in a 
vertically differentiated product context and Gilbert (2006) provides one in a horizontally 
differentiated product model. While the conclusions from Arrow’s analysis are thus not 
universal we can nevertheless argue that a very intense competitive situation yields a higher 
incentive, if the old product becomes obsolete (does not attract customers any more). 
 
So far the monopolist was completely shielded from competition. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 
propose a simple model in which the monopolist is threatened by a potential entrant. The 
monopolist has an old technology (or product). He considers investing in R&D to introduce a 
new technology. If he innovates the potential entrant does not enter. The entrant only enters 
the market if he has the new technology available. Hence, there are two mutually exclusive 
situations of which one is assumed to occur: a) the monopolist innovates and remains 
monopolist and b) the entrant innovates and a duopoly emerges. In this context the incentives 
to innovate are reversed compared to Arrow’s analysis. Here the status quo profit of the 
monopolist (using the old technology) does not matter, because the entrant will enter with the 
new technology if he does not innovate. Therefore the relevant profit difference compares his 
ex post monopoly profit (after successful innovation) with his duopoly profit which obtains if 
he does not innovate. The incentive of the entrant is measured by his duopoly profit. As the ex 
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post monopoly profit is always at least as large as the sum of both duopoly profits, the 
monopolist’s incentive is at least as large as the entrant’s incentive. Indeed, only if the old 
technology becomes obsolete, both incentives are equal.  
 
This model highlights another force: the efficiency effect as it was termed by Tirole (1989) 
and “competitive threat” by others. A dominant firm has more to loose, if a competitor rather 
than himself innovates. Thus, the force behind this effect is the competitive threat. Again, the 
conclusion of this simple model is vulnerable to changes in the assumptions. For instance, if 
there are several incumbents and the innovation lowers the costs slightly the innovating 
incumbent’s profits will only increase by a small amount. Likewise the profit may not 
decrease substantially when the entrant is successful. In such a case the entrant may have the 
larger incentive, e.g. Vickers (1985). The picture also changes if the assumption of equal costs 
among incumbents is relaxed (Boone (2001)). Nevertheless, the replacement and the 
efficiency effect turn out to be very helpful in understanding the relative incentives of firms.  
 
Both models could be understood as reflecting a situation where a new technology is 
developed by a pure research firm and the question is which firm would bid most for this 
innovation. They do not reflect well the situation where R&D is performed within the firms 
that supply the products based on the innovation. If this case is considered it should be 
acknowledged that innovation is an uncertain endeavour. In many cases several firms pursue 
similar ideas. Given our current focus on exclusive IP rights this will frequently mean that 
only one firm obtains the IP right (patent). This is the realm of the patent race literature. 
 
Its early contributions (for a summary see Reinganum (1989)) focuses on one innovation 
project usually paying no attention to the behaviour on product markets. There are at least two 
firms which compete to be the first in completing the innovation in which case the winning 
firm obtains an exogenously fixed “prize”. The prize is usually interpreted as the profit to be 
derived from a corresponding patent. Competition in innovative success works via 
investments in R&D which in turn influences the probability to be the first successful firm. 
The early contributions consider symmetric firms (equally capable and equal prize). They 
very much concentrate on the impact of the number of competing firms on innovation and 
provide conditions under which an increasing number of firms raises each firm’s innovative 
effort (Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1982)). It is often stressed that patent races imply 
too much innovative effort: As the firms only consider the impact of their efforts on their own 
success, they tend to invest “too much”. Furthermore, too many firms enter the patent race, 
although only one firm obtains the prize invalidating the efforts of the remaining firms. 
Hence, “duplication” of innovative effort is excessive. However, this view posits that 
innovative effort for one innovation project cannot be used for another project which is 
certainly not true in general. Moreover, the success of patented innovation may be more 
fragile, if more firms are competing. And finally, the prize does not correspond to social 
value. Even a monopolist cannot appropriate to full consumer surplus under usual 
circumstances. Today it seems agreed upon that innovation is not excessive from the social 
point of view (Scotchmer (2004), Katz and Shelanski (2006)), although there are also 
sceptical views e.g. Carlton and Gertner (2003). Hence, the value of this literature derives 
from the demonstration of the possibility that innovative efforts per firm may increase, if 
more firms compete for success, and that research efforts may turn out to be strategic 
complements.  
 
More relevant to merger analysis, however, are modelling strategies where firms start in an 
asymmetric situation as in Gilbert and Newbery (1982). The early contributions have 
considered a situation with 2 firms where one firm is a current incumbent and the other firm is 
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an entrant. The entrant may be interpreted as a firm with low profits before successful 
innovation. Reinganum (1983) shows that the potential success of the entrant induces the 
incumbent to invest in higher innovative efforts compared to the situation without an entrant 
(efficiency effect). If the innovation is such that the successful innovator captures a large 
share of the market, the entrant will nevertheless invest more in innovation than the 
incumbent (dominance of the replacement effect). The intuitive reasoning for this result is 
quite straight forward. In each period of time there are three possible states of nature: the 
incumbent is successful, the entrant is successful, and no firm is successful so far. Compare 
the first two events. In case of such an innovation both firms have similar profit differentials 
where these refer to the comparison of a successful innovation versus no successful 
innovation (small efficiency effect). Hence the incentive for both firms to win the race are of 
same order of magnitude from this point of view. However, in the third event the incumbent 
cannibalizes his current profit if he is successful and this reduces his incentive compared to 
the entrant (replacement effect). This framework can be generalized to more firms and put 
into a context with a potential stream of innovation projects. This induces a process of 
“creative destruction” where incumbents temporarily enjoy a comfortable “monopoly” 
position but where the identity of the incumbent changes continuously (Reinganum (1985)). If 
the entrant innovator only captures a modest market share the incentives of an incumbent may 
be stronger (dominance of the efficiency effect). It is at this point that the literature on patent 
races links easiest to the literature on the impact of product market competition on innovation.  
 
This implies that in this context both the replacement and the efficiency effect are at play. 
Their relative strength determines which type of firm has the larger incentive. And this in turn 
is closely connected to the innovative progress embodied in the new technology. If its induced 
product is considered to be of considerably higher value to consumers or if costs are reduced 
substantially, the innovator should capture a large part of the market. In this case the 
disadvantaged firm (the entrant) is predicted to have the higher incentive to innovate. 
 
The contributions of the patent race literature surveyed so far, use the exponential distribution 
for modelling the probability of success in a time interval as a function of R&D effort in this 
time interval. This leads to a memory-less structure of the model. The history of R&D efforts 
does not influence the probability of current success. Only current effort counts. Therefore 
R&D investments do not change over time in equilibrium. This modelling approach provides 
tractability, but neglects that past experience in R&D usually has an impact on current 
success. Indeed being ahead in a technology race cannot be modelled in this framework.  
 
This point has been taken up quite early e.g. by Fudenberg et al. (1983), Grossman and 
Shapiro (1987), Harris and Vickers (1987). They introduce several stages into a patent race. 
Each stage must be successfully completed, before the next stage can be entered. For each 
stage the probability of success is again exponential and depends on current R&D efforts. In 
this framework a firm is ahead if it has completed a stage before the rival does. These types of 
models usually suggest that a firm which is ahead will probably keep its leading position. The 
leader will invest more than the followers because completion of a stage increases the 
incentives to invest in R&D. Although followers may catch up or even leapfrog the current 
leader in principle, the probability of winning is higher for the leader. As being the leader is 
therefore a rewarding goal, competition for leadership is very intense in many of these 
models, whenever rivals perceive themselves as equally advanced in the technology race. The 
result that the dynamics of R&D competition reinforces dominant positions in the R&D 
dimension obviously adds another aspect which is not necessarily connected to either the 
replacement or the efficiency effect. If an incumbent firm has more experience in conducting 
R&D for a certain project this effect would complement the efficiency effect and diminish the 
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replacement effect. This builds on the assumption that this effect of a leading position in a 
patent race holds for sufficiently general circumstances. 
 
Unfortunately, this assumption turns out to be wrong. Doraszelski (2003) uses the same 
modelling strategy as Reinganum (1982) but allows the current success probability to depend 
on the accumulated R&D investments. This variation forces this author to rely on numerical 
simulations for many of his results. He adds the knowledge effect: If one firm has accumulated 
more knowledge its chances to win the race are increased and therefore further R&D efforts 
are less rewarding. The leading firm can afford to rest on its laurels. Hence, this effect is 
completely contrary to the effect that was suggested by the stages of innovation approach 
reviewed in the last section. This may induce the follower to invest more in R&D and to catch 
up. While this effect is not strategic, strategic effects play an important role. But these are far 
from being unambiguous. Firms may react aggressively or submissively to an increase in the 
knowledge base of the rival. They may compete most intensely or not if their knowledge 
stocks are similar. If the stock of knowledge exhibits decreasing or constant returns the 
knowledge effect induces the follower to invest more in R&D. If there are increasing returns 
his numerical results suggest that the follower invests more if his knowledge base is 
sufficiently large.  
 
Hence, the implications from the patent race literature are clearly not pointing to an 
unambiguous direction. Much depends on the relative strength of the replacement, efficiency 
and knowledge effect, while the strength of the latter also depends on the economies of scale 
of knowledge accumulation. If a prediction from this can be deduced, it would suggest that for 
a relatively risk-free innovation project (small impact of the replacement effect), for which 
experience in relevant R&D is desirable, a dominating firm in product and innovation markets 
has the best incentives and chances to complete the project successfully. 
 
All of these contributions aim at one innovation project. This neglects the fact that a level of 
technological competence may not only be valuable for one project but for more projects. In 
such a situation the race never ends (in contrast to the patent race). One successfully 
completed project is supplanted by another project, sequentially or even simultaneously. And 
the success in preceding projects helps in securing income. Being ahead (more successful 
projects) usually provides an advantage. Such an analysis could borrow from modelling 
approaches reviewed at the end of section 2.1 (Aghion et al. (2005), Hörner (2004)). To the 
best of my knowledge such an encompassing analysis does not exist so far. 
 
2.3 Empirical studies 
 
Given the fact that theoretical studies tell us that details matter, empirical analysis has the 
potential to sort out details that may matter theoretically but are of negligible importance in 
practice. The early empirical literature has produced a wealth of studies on the relationship of 
firm size or industry concentration and R&D connected to the so called Schumpeter 
hypotheses. As mergers usually increase the size of a firm and also increase concentration it 
would be valuable to have solid information on this link. However, as Cohen and Levin 
(1989) remark in their survey: “The most notable feature of this considerable body of 
empirical research on the relationship between firm size and innovation is its 
inconclusiveness.” and “The empirical results concerning how firm size and market structure 
relate to innovation are perhaps most accurately described as fragile.” Many potential causes 
for this unsatisfactory outcome have been put forward. One of them is certainly the mismatch 
of quite coarse and aggregated data (e.g. R&D expenditures on the firm level) with the 
theoretical details.  
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Given the effort that theorists have put into explaining an inverse U-shaped – see above – it is 
noteworthy that Levin et al. (1985) found evidence of such a shape. They used R&D intensity 
and a rate of introductions of innovations (at the FTC line of business level) as a measure of 
innovative activity and the concentration ratio CR4 as a measure of concentration. This 
relationship peaked statistically significantly at a concentration ratio of about 0.5 which is 
quite in line with Scherer’s (1967) earlier finding in this respect. However, the significance of 
the concentration variables dramatically decreased when Levin et al. introduced measures of 
technological opportunity and appropriability for each firm.  
 
What do the more recent empirical studies tell us? With respect to the relationship of 
innovation and size the papers by Cohen and Klepper (1996a, 1996b) are instructive. In their 
1996a paper they find e.g. that R&D expenditures are increasing in size where size is 
measured on the business unit and not at the corporate level. Moreover, adding size (sales) at 
the corporate level does add almost no explanatory power. This is in line with the theoretical 
arguments summarized in section 2.1 (predominance of the “demand effect”). These 
theoretical arguments focus on a specific market. An empirical validation therefore should not 
start on a corporate level when measuring size of the relevant entity but closer to a relevant 
market section of the respective company. Therefore the size of a business unit is better suited 
for such a test than the corporate size. This also speaks against arguments (in the 
“Schumpeter”-tradition) saying that large firms provide a better platform (more internal 
funds, economies of scope etc.) to provide incentives for innovation. 
 
These authors also find that the impact of the size on product innovations is insignificant. In 
their 1996b paper they substantiate the view that the R&D proportion of process innovations 
among all innovative efforts is increasing in size. In their theoretical reasoning supporting this 
view they distinguish process and product innovation by the ability to market the innovation 
in a disembodied form (license). Their view is that product innovations are easier to 
successfully license than are process innovations. Given that therefore small firms are more 
likely to perform product innovations which are patentable and that patent counts are 
frequently employed as performance measures of innovation this could partly explain why 
small firms within one industry are usually reported to be more efficient in using their R&D 
expenditures (e.g. Acs and Audretsch (1988)). Indeed this is considered a stylized fact by 
Cohen and Klepper. 
 
Despite the fact that the theoretical underpinning of the demand effect rests on symmetric 
models these can be used to suggest an increased incentive of larger business units. The 
alternative approach rests on the Gilbert and Newberry approach and distinguishes between 
“incumbents” and “entrants” and is thus asymmetric. In a patent race version of Reinganum 
the efficiency effect has to be weighed against the replacement effect. Depending on the 
relative strength of these effects the incumbent has a higher incentive to innovate or not. In 
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) the authors use the Mannheim innovation panel (MIP) to shed 
light on the impact of such asymmetric situations. The panel contains survey answers on the 
question whether firms primarily defend their market position (incumbents) or whether they 
plan to expand to new markets (entrants). From this it is clear that incumbents and entrants do 
not necessarily exhibit different sizes. Indeed in a tobit analysis with R&D intensity as a 
function of size, status of being entrant, and some other determinants size exhibits a positive 
and significant impact. More importantly the status of being a challenger has a positive and 
significant impact while an interaction term of being a defensive firm with a large share of the 
market has a negative effect. This supports a view that the replacement effect is stronger than 
the efficiency effect. In a follow up study Czarnitzki and Kraft (2005) show that incumbents’ 
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R&D expenditures on licenses are higher than those of entrants independently of whether 
these are measured as intensity (over sales) or as share of total R&D expenditures. Hence, the 
efficiency effect is dominant for these types of R&D expenditures which is nicely in line with 
the theoretical findings in section 2.2. Again, these measures of license expenditures increase 
with size. 
 
These findings speak for a positive relationship of size and R&D measures. But they also 
show that other dimensions are important as well. Czarnitzki and Kraft point at the strategic 
options open to a firm. A defensive corporate strategy has different consequences compared 
to an expansionary strategy. Interestingly, size matters in their study despite the firm level 
data employed.  
 
As we now turn to the effect of market structure on innovation, it is noteworthy that the 
Herfindahl measures of concentration fail to be significant in the papers by Czarnitzki and 
Kraft. They include a firm specific Lerner index in their 2005 study and find that this index 
has a significant and positive impact on license expenditures.  
 
Blundell et al. (1999) find that concentration matters. They find that fewer innovations 
(innovation counts, SPRU data on British firms between 1972 and 1982) are introduced in 
more concentrated (measured by CR5 ) industries and that within industries larger firms 
introduce more innovations. Interestingly, cash flow of firms turns out not to be a significant 
determinant of innovative activities. Hence, the deep pocket argument for large firms being 
conducive for financing innovation does not find support here. They account for the 
simultaneity of innovation and product market activities by lagged variables.  
 
The study by Aghion et al. (2005) (cp. section 2.1) did not only contain a theoretical model 
which can account for an inversely U-shaped relationship between innovation and 
competition but also finds empirical support for this possibility. In this study innovation is 
measured on an industry level by the average number of patents weighted by citation 
numbers. Intensity of competition was measured by an average Lerner index. These authors 
account for the simultaneity by using information of some relevant policy changes.  
 
Kukuk and Stadler (2005) present a study based on the MIP (see above). They introduce 
another distinction on an empirical level: the competition in the innovation market and the 
competition in the product market. Based on questions as to how many rivals firms face in the 
product markets (3 categories) and as to how firms view their technological rivalry in the 
future (reduced, unchanged, increased) they find that the rivalry in the technological market 
increases planned innovations while the rivalry in the product market does not significantly 
change them. Moreover, size enhances such efforts significantly. They show also that past 
innovations are a very potent predictor of future innovations, a finding which is confirmed 
e.g. by Peters (2006). All of these results remain essentially unchanged if product and process 
innovations are distinguished – with the exception that size does not matter for product 
innovations which confirms Cohen and Klepper. 
 
Finally, Tang (2006) provides a fairly detailed correlation analysis on the basis of a recent 
Canadian innovation survey. The study distinguishes between innovation inputs and outputs 
and 4 categories of competition. The latter are: 1) ease of substitution by rivals’ products, 2) 
constant arrival of new competing products, 3) obsolescence of products, and 4) rapid change 
of technologies. All of the data are generated by perceptions of the relevant managers. The 
author attributes category 1) to product market competition and the remaining categories to 
technology competition. The latter part seems to be highly debatable. Three correlation 
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analyses are performed: innovation output versus competition, innovation output versus 
innovation input, and innovation input versus competition. 
 
Innovation output is measured by product innovation, process innovation or both. Firms 
responded on a yes or no basis. The respective multinomial logit regression reveals the 
following picture: Easy substitutability diminishes the innovative output of those firms which 
have product innovations only or product and process innovations, while firms with process 
innovations only have no significant dependence on this potential determinant. The remaining 
categories of competitive threat increase innovative output in product innovation and 
simultaneous product and process innovation. For firms with process innovations only quick 
obsolescence turns out to be significantly negative. A size dummy is significantly positive for 
all types of innovation with the exception of firms conducting product innovation only. 
 
Innovation input is measured by “acquisition of technology”, “R&D only” and “R&D and 
acquisition of technology”. R&D is primarily connected to product innovation while 
acquisition of technology is mainly linked to process innovation. A size dummy is not 
significant for almost all specifications. Innovation input in relation to competitive intensity 
reveals similar patterns as the innovation-competition link. Again, if perceived substitutability 
has a significant effect then it turns out to be negative (for the product plus process innovation 
category).  
 
Hence judging from these few contributions which afforded the effort to account for 
simultaneity bias, which introduced more dimensions, and which used more voluminous and 
detailed data, things seem to be on more secure ground, but the consensus what makes up a 
secure ground is not yet decided. Size seems to be a good candidate for a positive impact on 
process innovation, while it is not for product innovation. However, data sources and 
dimensions vary widely. Some are quantitative in the sense that they give the share of sales, 
some are quantitative in the sense that they provide a count of innovations (e.g. patent 
counts), some are just reporting the fact of innovation or no innovation. All of these situations 
induce different methodological requests which are not always appropriately taken care of.  
 
More importantly, many empirical analyses give rise to the impression that they do not give 
attention to the findings of competing studies. If they do, this is often at such an aggregate 
level that the claim of the original study can hardly be recognized. This criticism holds also 
for the relationship of empirical studies to theoretical ones. Usually one study is picked 
without considering the qualifying assumptions of these studies. Hence, claims are usually 
exaggerated. Indeed, one cannot avoid the impression that theoretical arguments are used 
after an empirical “result” has been obtained which requires an explanation.  
 
While this can justifiably interpreted as bad practice on the empirical front the reverse applies 
as well: Theorists have provided some isolated chunks. This was adequate at the beginning of 
theoretical reasoning in this respect. But now, empirical analysis has provided some evidence 
which is not easily consistent with the partial analysis of theoretical reasoning. Despite the 
pitfalls with which these empirical analyses may be inflicted, it would be very helpful, if 
theorists would take the empirical endeavours as serious indications of what happens in the 
world of innovation. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
The relation between the intensity of product market competition and innovation turns out to 
be far more complex as some commentators seem to imply. This complexity starts with the 
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notion of intensity of competition. Depending on what meaning is given to this term theory 
suggests diverging implications. This is particularly clear in the framework of “non-
exclusionary” IP rights. Intense competition may be due to more rivals, easy substitution 
possibilities by customers, ease and frequency of entry. It is therefore not very surprising that 
empirical studies have not found a robust relation when using cross industry studies and only 
one indicator of product market intensity. Rather it is in line with the theoretical literature that 
concentration measures like the Herfindahl index and market power indices like the Lerner 
index may give opposing results (e.g. Czarnitzki and Kraft). The finding by Kukuk and 
Stadler according to which the product market competition does not matter while the 
competition in the innovation market has a significant impact are also in accordance with 
theory in that its arguments point at the importance of the competitive situation in a product 
market after successful completion of an innovation project. For this their indicator for the 
intensity technology competition may be a suitable proxy.  
 
Size turns out to be positively correlated with innovation activities in most studies with the 
exception of product innovations. This fits nicely with the theoretical arguments if process 
innovations are attributed to the “non-exclusionary” category. However, size is not 
necessarily a guarantee for large R&D input and large innovative outputs. Several 
contributions point to the dependence on the strategic situation (illustrating the relevance of 
the effects laid out in section 2.2) or on the level of unit (firm versus business unit). Some 
studies do not support the view that the financial capacity of a big firm induces more 
innovative efforts. There is also evidence the efficiency in the transformation from innovative 
inputs into outputs is higher with smaller firms. And all of them confirm the view that details 
matter.  
 
 
3. Mergers and acquisitions 
 
Some mergers and acquisitions are motivated by the prospect to obtain access to technological 
knowledge. Hence, mergers do not only have an impact on innovation but also innovation 
may have an impact on merger activity. This has obvious consequences for econometric work. 
If for no other reason it seems therefore important to gather information on the causes and 
consequences of merger activity. In the following section the theoretical literature on this 
issue is summarized. Section 3.2 contains an overview of the empirical literature. 
 
3.1 Mergers in the theoretical literature 
 
Most studies are driven by an interest to inform competition policy or to understand why so 
many mergers do not fulfil their promises. Managers usually claim synergies of various sorts 
as their reason to merge with another company. In as far such synergies save economic 
resources mergers would not be subject to criticism from a welfare point of view. Antitrust 
concerns aim at the consequences of a merger for market power. At least the competition 
between the merging parties can be expected to diminish or even to disappear. Therefore it 
can be safely assumed that prices would increase for this reason cet. par. and thus welfare 
would decrease (Schulz (2003)). Of course, for a full picture the potential advantage of 
synergies in costs (the efficiency defence) have to be weighed against the danger of increased 
prices.  
 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide an analysis which shows that a merger can only be welfare 
enhancing if it triggers substantial cost reductions. This result can in their analysis also be 
expressed as a function concentrations ratios. Under the hypothesis that mergers are only 
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achieved if profits rise, this boils down to a threshold value of concentration. If the 
concentration of a merger is below this threshold a merger is welfare increasing.  
 
As both synergies and increased market power speak for increased profits, ceteris paribus, this 
provides a puzzle against the empirical evidence that many mergers do not perform and 
indeed destroy profits (see section 3.2). One potential reason for this empirical finding may be 
that synergies do not materialize but to the contrary considerable transaction costs related to 
joining the two companies do arise. The early theoretical literature has also found a reason 
that is not dependent on merger related cost reductions: The remaining firms in the market 
may react in a way that renders the merger unprofitable. This was formally shown by Salant et 
al. (1983) or Perry and Porter (1985) in a context where costs do not change in a relevant way 
due to the merger and competition is modelled as a homogenous Cournot oligopoly. The 
intuition for this result is quite straightforward: After such a merger the merger parties restrain 
their output. This increases the price and thus provides an incentive for the remaining firms to 
increase their output. They show that this in turn decreases the profits of the merging parties 
to such an extent that they loose profits compared to the status quo, unless the merger 
comprises a very large part of the industry. Obviously, this effect cannot work, if the merger 
creates a monopoly.  
 
This result is also noteworthy in the context of empirical work as it highlights the importance 
of reactions by merger outsiders. Ignoring them may lead to completely misleading 
conclusions. However, it also leaves us also with a puzzle. Most mergers are not close to 
creating monopolies. Hence we are told that most merger proposals are unprofitable. Why are 
they proposed, if they destroy profitability? This question has occupied quite a number of 
studies.  
 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) present a model in a price setting oligopoly with 
differentiated products. Here, mergers indeed gain even if they are “small”. However, the 
outsiders usually gain more. The reason is again that the merger provides a positive 
externality on the remaining firms: Due to the merger the participating parties increase prices 
which provides incentives to the merger outsiders to increase their prices in such a way that 
their market share increases as well. This provides another puzzle: While now a merger may 
be profitable on its own, a firm may gain more if it turns down a merger proposal. Why 
should mergers form in such a context? It may be noteworthy at this stage to point out that 
some authors categorize mergers as “anticompetitive” if they impose a positive externality on 
rivals (e.g. Fridolfsson (2007)). This has an empirical analogue: in the empirical literature 
mergers are sometimes classified as anticompetitive if the merger-outsiders’ share prices rise 
in reaction to a merger. 
 
While the distinction of quantity versus price competition resolves one incentive puzzle 
(market power can increase profits despite reactions from rivals) it is still not clear why 
mergers form. One suggestion in quantity setting context by Daughety (1990) was that a 
merger provides a superior position vis-à-vis the remaining firms. This is modelled by 
granting the merging firm a Stackelberg leadership position. Now a merger becomes 
profitable for most cases. But now a merger typically increases the output which would imply 
zero antitrust activities against mergers. There have been some refinements on this approach: 
e.g. Creane and Davidson (2005) and Huck et al. (2004)).  
 
Banal-Estanol (2007) provides a paper where merger incentives are influenced by private 
information about cost or demand parameters in a quantity competition framework. He finds 
that there always higher incentives to merge in such an uncertain environment and that the 
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welfare consequences are usually less objectionable than in a corresponding deterministic 
case from an social surplus point of view. Davidson and Mukherjee (2007) present a model 
where entry and exit is free. In such a context the distinction between quantity versus price 
competition is not very relevant and usually firms considering a merger will find it profitable 
and more so than remaining alone.  
 
From these studies one could conclude that the results of the early studies on this issue are 
substantially modified, if more aspects are introduced in the analysis. But it is advisable to be 
cautious about this conclusion, because all of them are in a ceteris paribus manner. There does 
not exist rigorous studies joining several aspects at a time. 
 
All of these studies are examples of comparative analysis. They show that even in their fairly 
restricted modelling framework the consequences of an exogenously determined merger 
proposal may be quite different with respect to profit incentives - even when constrained to 
pure market power effects. If profits would usually increase after a merger this might not be 
considered as particularly relevant, but in many cases mergers are not profit enhancing. Thus, 
it would not be wise to dispose of the knowledge contained in them. 
 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that these analyses neglect many aspects. Among these is 
the question as to which firms are likely to merge. As the setup of the above models is 
symmetric (same costs and demand conditions for all firms), it is not surprising that the 
respective contributions do not provide an answer to this question. There is however a small 
literature on endogenous mergers.  
 
Kamien and Zang (1990) present a model where all firms simultaneously can bid for every 
other firm and at the same time decide on a price at which they are willing sell out. In contrast 
to Salant et al. a merged company may induce the merged firms to compete against each 
other. The reason behind this lies in the fact that the competition among merged firms –which 
cannibalises profits on one hand – diminishes the external effect on the remaining rivals on 
the other hand. This can be profitable and can in the end also justify that complete 
monopolization does not occur in such a set up, if the number of competitors is large enough 
at the beginning. It should however be noted that this approach allows for a vast variety of 
equilibria, among which the one with the qualified characteristics is only one. 
 
Horn and Persson (2001) use a framework of cooperative game theory to generate conclusions 
on the end result of a merger process. Given their use of the core concept it is not entirely 
surprising that such a process would end in monopoly if permitted by competition authorities 
and by mergers with maximum industry profits if all mergers but the one to monopoly are 
prohibited. Obviously this gives a fairly different picture compared with Kamien and Zang.  
 
One wonders which of the unrealistic features of both models is responsible. It is certainly not 
an aspect of real life that all firms bid for every other firm and each is prepared to sell out at 
an appropriate price at each moment in time. Nor does the concept of the core necessarily 
provide a valid prediction of a dynamic merger process. It is therefore helpful that other 
authors have tried to model the merger process itself. 
 
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005a and b) and Fridolfsson (2007) suggest a setup where mergers 
are responding to shocks. In each period there is a certain probability that a specific firm is up 
to make a merger proposal to another firm. These exogenous shocks are attributed to effects 
of deregulation, globalization or technological progress. Some part of these studies is devoted 
to merger control which will be suppressed here. These studies have – among other aspects – 
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an important message for empirical work: Profits may go down due to merger and 
simultaneously share prices may go up. This argument is contained in Fridolfsson and 
Stennek (2005b). The intuition is simple: A merger may decrease profits, but profits may 
decrease even more if a firm does not participate in a merger. Of course, this is only possible 
if the merger imposes a negative externalities on outside rivals. Such a case may occur if the 
merged entity lowers costs to a large extent or –more relevant for the current purpose – if the 
merged entity introduces a major innovation. Hence a nominal decrease of profits cannot be 
interpreted per se as failing success. The relevant comparison is not profit after completed 
merger and status quo profits but those related to the status that would have been obtained 
otherwise. This has some similarities to the relevant arguments in the patent race literature 
summarized above. In addition, in a world where demand for a recent innovative product 
increases such “first round” loss may pay off in the future as well aimed investment.  
 
The most relevant message for empirical work from all of these studies is: The impact of a 
merger can only be justifiably judged, if the impact of the merger on the remaining rivals (the 
external effect) is accounted for. This impact may be positive (“anti-competitive merger”) or 
positive (“pro-competitive merger”) and may thus work in opposite directions.  
 
The most ambitious approach is due to Gowrisankaran (2001) which builds on Ericson and 
Pakes (1995). In this model firms can decide on merger, exit, capital investment, and entry in 
each period. The merger decision is not up to every active firm but only to the largest firm at 
the beginning of each period. The author looks for a Markov perfect equilibrium of this 
dynamic game. The model cannot be solved analytically. Therefore the author uses numerical 
simulation methods to obtain results. Among these are: in most cases the possibility of 
mergers induces higher producer surplus and lower consumer surplus. Moreover, the firms 
invest less in a regime allowing mergers. As in the words of the author the investment is 
sometimes interpreted as R&D this has some bearing on the basic question underlying this 
survey. It should be noted however, that the basics of the model use a regular (stochastic) 
investment story. 
 
Summarizing these results it seems clear that the (positive or negative) external effect in 
Salant et al. and others is important and cannot be disregarded a priori. Aside from this a 
multitude of impacts of merger activity is possible - and partly due to this externality. The 
incentive to merge may in the end be positively associated with the expected level of market 
power and it may also be positively associated to a decrease joint costs of the merged parties. 
The latter part is not analyzed in the theoretical literature and the former part has not such an 
unambiguous impact. Hence, empirical evaluation seems appropriate. 
 
3.2 Empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions 
 
As one can read from the last section, theorists have to admit that they have found some 
interesting results on the impact of mergers but they do not offer a specific cause for mergers, 
aside from some exogenous shocks. The empirical literature has devoted most of its efforts on 
impacts as well. But there are also some contributions on the causes of mergers.  
 
One strand of the literature on the consequences of mergers - which is more in the tradition of 
industrial organization - studies the performance of merged firms. A typical contribution 
would look at the evolution of profits of a merged entity and compare it with some industry 
specific benchmark. The most recent large scale work is due to Gugler et al. (2003). Based on 
an international database of mergers they have data on 2704 mergers one year after 
completion of the merger and on 1250 mergers five year after completion. The figures for 
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year 2 -4 are in between these values. They compare actual profits and sales in the first 5 
years after completion with projected profits and sales based on the respective performance of 
the median firm in the industry. Based on this comparison the mean profits of mergers are 
significantly (at the 10% level or better) higher for each year while their sales are strongly 
significantly (at the 1% level) lower for each year. Both results are in line with most other 
work on this issue (cp. Gugler et al. (2003) or Schulz (2003)). 
 
For each year the authors also provide the percentage of those merged companies with a 
higher profit. For the 5-th year (with small variations for the remaining years) they report 
57.6% of all merged firms which implies that about 43% of the merged firms fared worse 
compared to what had happened without the merger. This figure is comparable with numbers 
usually provided by consulting firms which claim about 50% failures. Hence, the overall 
positive picture on mergers – in terms of profits – has considerable dark spots. 
 
The authors also try to shed light on the question whether the merger had positive efficiency 
effects. They argue that a decrease in sales after a merger speaks for an efficiency decline (if 
profits decline as well) or for a dominating increase in market power (if profits increase). This 
concerns 55.8% of all mergers. In both cases this would imply that welfare declines. 
Pesendorfer (2003) finds for the paper industry that about three quarters of the acquiring firms 
loose market shares, but at the same time most firms experience cost savings after the merger. 
He estimates profit increases for merged firms on average. But his estimates also predict an 
increase in welfare for those market segments where such an impact is significant. This casts 
doubt on the interpretation of Gugler et al. (2003). 
 
Andrade et al. (2001) provide - among other aspects - an overview on the literature 
predominantly affiliated with the finance literature. This literature uses event studies 
analyzing the change of share prices of acquiring and target firms around the announcement 
date. Like this strand of literature in general, the authors find that the share price of the 
acquiring firm typically decreases (not significantly at the 5% level, one day after 
announcement versus one day before announcement) while the share price of target firms 
usually rise considerably and significantly. The combined effect is positive but quite close to 
zero. These results are quite stable for a subdivision of the time span from 1973 to 1998 in 
decades.  
 
The overall picture seems thus again moderately positive. However, there remains the puzzle 
why the share holders of target firms are usually the only winners while the share holders of 
the acquiring firm break even at best. Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002) develop a theoretical 
model to explain that this may be due to the fact that an announcement of an acquisition 
reveals the high value of the target and low value of the acquirer. This is partly consistent 
with the findings of McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) to the effect that targets are more 
productive (up to a certain size). However, this is not completely convincing. If more 
productive (targets) firms can ask a higher price this suggests that there are more bidders. If 
this is the case why did this information not show up in share prices according to the efficient 
market hypothesis on which the finance literature is based? On the other hand, in as far plants 
were acquired, why would a firm gain by selling an above average productive plant? Hence, 
the puzzle is not resolved. 
 
Moreover, the fact that the returns for an average acquiring firm is not significantly different 
from zero does not mean that there are no considerable wealth effects. Moeller et al. (2005) 
consider the US merger waves in the eighties and nineties of the past century. They found that 
share holders of acquiring firms lost 240 billion dollars in the nineties (versus 7 billion dollars 
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in the eighties) and that this is not matched by the gain of the share holders of target firms. 
The combined wealth of both groups falls by 134 billion dollars in the nineties. These authors 
try also to explain their findings on the grounds of the results of a voluminous literature which 
attempts to relate the returns of acquiring firms to their characteristics or the characteristics of 
a deal (e.g. stock versus cash). This literature is referenced there (their section IV) and is not 
repeated here because the authors did not find the respective results helpful to explain their 
finding which casts doubt on the generality of those results.  
 
According to this type of studies the stock price performance of acquiring firms is even worse 
if a longer time interval is allowed for comparison. E.g. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that 
acquiring firms using stock financing have returns of -25.2% over the five-year period after 
the merger. On the other hand, the same authors find that for cash mergers earn 18.5%. 
However, Andrade et al. (2001) and others are highly sceptical on a great variety of 
methodological concerns. One important concern is the validity - underlying most of the event 
studies - that the expected return in the 3 day window is close to zero quite independently of a 
sensible composition of the employed market portfolio.  
 
Betzer and Metzger (2006) present a study which provides an event study and a study on the 
profit performance based on the same data set. Regarding both studies separately they are in 
line with those reported above. This is despite the fact they employ a matching approach, 
meaning that they look for a firm which has more or less the same characteristics like size and 
profitability to the firms before merger and compare the performance (profit and abnormal 
return respectively) using these matching firms. Given the theoretical arguments of 
Fridolfsson and Stennek this cannot necessarily be expected, as the external effects exhibited 
in their arguments should hit a matching firm more than a median firm of an industry. 
Nevertheless they find support for the view that profit performance and stock market 
performance do not necessarily coincide. In this they support the arguments of Fridolfsson 
and Stennek, while it has to be kept in mind that the discrepancy of these two measures of 
success was known before this study and was indeed a starting point for these authors. For 
their category “intra industry transaction and industry peer group” they find 38% of 
transactions which show decreased profits but increased returns. In the same category they 
find that both profits and returns show an increase for only approximately 29% of the 
transactions. Given that there is a very low correlation between success in profits and success 
in returns the authors argue that both methods should not be treated as substitutes but as 
complements. 
 
Summarizing these studies, the average deal in mergers and acquisitions is successful, if 
measured by profit or return increases respectively, but not jointly. At least in the US the last 
merger wave in the late nineties had a positive average return but lead to a massive 
destruction of wealth. Overall there remains the question on why target firms profit so much 
more than the acquirers. 
 
Studies on the causes of mergers and acquisitions echo the theoretical modelling to a large 
extent in that they attribute an important effect to exogenous factors. E.g. Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) perform such a study and analyze the merger wave in the eighties of the past 
century. They first find that M&A activities are different in different industries. Usually they 
cluster in some specific industries and even within these industries they cluster in a short 
period of time like two years. This can be considered as a first indication that the thrust of 
M&A activities is indeed industry specific. The authors engage into two sorts of empirical 
investigations of this phenomenon. First they consider whether there has been an industry 
specific shock which they measure as the deviation of sales growth (employment growth 
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resp.) from the mean of all industries in their sample (which are 51) in absolute terms. A 
regression analysis reveals that such shocks are positively and significantly related to these 
activities, while growth of sales (employment) are not significant predictors. Given the fact 
that these shocks are measured as absolute deviations from the overall average this means that 
booming as well as distressed industries attract larger M&A activities. As both types may 
have different implications for the (relative) performance it seems relevant to distinguish 
these types when considering the merger performance. 
 
Second, they analyze several shocks such as deregulation, oil price shock, foreign competition 
and financial innovation. They relate these changes which are partly due to governmental 
action in industries which are considerably affected by them. They find that deregulation and 
financial innovation are significant while the remaining two are not. Deregulation has a 
positive impact. Financial innovations consist in the emergence of junk bonds as a means for 
financing M&A. They argue that R&D intensive industries are less attractive. Therefore they 
use the R&D intensity of an industry as proxy with the interpretation that those industries with 
a high intensity are less prone to attract M&A activity. This is supported by their econometric 
results and this finding in turn supports the more general hypothesis that mergers and 
acquisitions are driven by sector specific shocks, while the macroeconomic influences do not 
play a decisive role (growth rates are not significant). The clustering phenomenon is also 
confirmed by Andrade et al. (2001) for the nineties with an even stronger relationship to 
deregulation. For an overview on differing views on merger waves and an attempt to 
discriminate among them see Gugler et al. (2006). 
 
Gugler and Siebert (2004) present a study of the semiconductor industry which is interesting 
in several respects. First, they study the impact of mergers (and research joint ventures RJV) 
on market share. For this industry mergers (and RJV) significantly increase the market share 
of the involved companies. Comparing these results with those of Gugler et al. (2003) speaks 
again for industry specific analysis of merger impacts. Second, although they are not the first 
to do so, they point at the simultaneity problem that such empirical studies face. If – as in 
their study - the effect of mergers on market share is considered, it may be the case that there 
is a common factor – e.g. productivity - triggering both an increase in market share and 
mergers. Therefore they estimate an endogenous switching model and find that firms 
expecting that a merger will increase their market shares are significantly more likely to 
actually merge. While thus the expectation of an increased market share increases the 
probability of being involved in a merger the authors look at other determinants of this 
probability. They use the accumulated patents, the size of the firm (total assets), its scope 
(indicator for the number of markets in which the firm is active), year and country effects. All 
of these variables turn out to be significant. As for the year dummies this conforms with 
Mitchell and Mulherin. Size and scope effects are positive and the stock of patents is negative. 
Interestingly, the results are very similar if the probability to form a RJV is considered - with 
the exception that the stock of patents turns out to be positively related. This is more or less 
consistent with the results found for propensity scores by Danzon et al. (2004) or Hall (1999). 
 
3.3 Summary 
 
From the preceding sections it seems clear that the overall view of the causes and 
consequences of mergers is still far from unanimous or unambiguous. The consequences – 
usually analyzed in terms of profitability and return – are positive on average but not 
necessarily when wealth effects are considered. At least some 30% of M&A transactions 
seem to be a failure in terms of profits or returns. Moeller et al. (2005) point to the effect that 
the disastrous wealth effects of the last merger wave (nineties until 2001) is due to some few 
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spectacular failures. This may serve as a supporting argument for merger control although the 
mission of merger control is quite a different one. But it is hoped that this injunction can be 
helpful for correcting the opinion of those who view merger control as means to inhibit wealth 
creation. 
 
Indeed, the interpretation of the impacts of merger and acquisitions is obviously connected to 
the interpretation of the causes of these activities. E.g. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) claim 
that antitrust authorities suspect merger candidates to enhance their market power while – in 
their view – they may only consist in a “normal” restructuring phase of an industry following 
a shock. The question whether it should be interpreted in this way.  
 
The analysis of competition authorities follows economic theory in so far as they see market 
power is an important concern. It should however be noted that market power cannot really be 
considered as the cause of a specific merger. If market power is an incentive for a merger at a 
certain date, why was it not before? Hence, there is always an “exogenous” factor triggering 
merging activities. The incentives to increase market power compared to the current one must 
have increased. Hence shocks, may be industry specific shocks, are necessary to bring the 
theoretical argument of market power to bear. But a merger always provides the opportunity 
to realign prices, qualities, and product lines to the best of a company, not necessarily to the 
best of consumers. It increases the scope of a firm to react independently from the rivals (for 
the internal dimensions of the competitive instruments). This is exactly, what market power 
means. Hence, market power is unavoidably connected to a merger or acquisition. The 
question is rather, whether this increased scope of opportunities is used in favour of 
consumers or in favour of firms exclusively. The latter is a matter of concern.  
 
This implies that mergers remain in the arena for justified scrutiny by competition authorities. 
But this does not deny that firms may react to industry shocks by merger and acquisitions 
because this is the most efficient way to deal with them. While industry wide shocks may be 
important triggers for M&A it should not be denied that firm specific “shocks” can also 
attribute to the propensity to merge and acquire. For the present purpose, a pharmaceutical 
firm which runs out of patented drugs and is threatened by generic drugs, because its specific 
stochastic outcome of the R&D process was a complete failure, may be induced to acquire a 
firm which owns some recently patented and licensed drug. Hence, in broad terms the 
incentive to merge is triggered in part by economic conditions impacting on the industry, in 
part on new technologies, and in part on firm specific fortunes in R&D or marketing activities 
and the like. Given this it seems wise to concentrate on specific features. It seems more 
adequate to consider specific industries and fairly detailed data to assess the acquiring and 
target firms alternatives. Finally, the arguments of Fridolfsson and co-authors imply that 
M&A transactions cannot be fully understood, if the consequences for merger outsiders are 
neglected. 
 
 
 
 
4. Additional aspects 
 
In this section some aspects are included which are complementary to the basic forces 
summarized in sections 2 and 3. We add a few remarks on licensing, spillovers, corporate 
finances, R&D management, and on the notion of technological opportunity and 
appropriability in the following subsections. 
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4.1 Licensing 
 
In section 2 a very restricted set of property rights was considered: non-exclusionary rights 
and exclusionary rights. With the first variant licences have no role to play. This is different 
for the second variant. So far, this was not considered. The prize from winning a patent race 
was more or less exogenously fixed. When the patent race literature deals with the 
determinants of post innovation profit, then they refer to product market competition. 
However, the prize may also include license fees. The strand of literature dealing with 
licensing has found differing incentives and impacts relating to these. The common picture is 
that license fees help to provide incentives for innovation and thus induce more of it. But 
licensing can also be used in order to lower the incentives of a rival for innovating around a 
patent which the licensor owns (Gallini and Winter (1985)). We will concentrate on the more 
positive view on licensing. 
 
Some part of the literature focuses on the licensing of one incumbent firm to one or more 
rivals. Most of this literatures (e.g. Katz and Shapiro (1986) or Kamien and Tauman (2002)) 
studies a cost reducing innovation and operates under the assumption that no future 
innovation will occur. Even in this situation one might think that firms to do not have an 
incentive to license a cost reducing innovation, as the lower cost of the rival will induce more 
intense product market competition. But the net impact of licensing depends very much on the 
intensity of product market competition. If competition is low (i.e., both are quasi local 
monopolists) a license will generate income for the licensor without changing the intensity of 
competition in an essential way. In this case licensing is profitable. If on the other hand 
product market competition is very intense, a license may not be profitable. This suggests that 
a merger – by reducing the intensity of product market competition – may not be detrimental 
to licensing and thus innovation incentives in the current context. It should be noted, however,  
that the assumption that future innovations are not feasible (or likely) is not convincing. In 
that licenses may improve on the capability of a rival to invent another cost reducing process 
the incentive to license are obviously dampened. However, there are also ways to overcome 
the latter problem. It is quite common (e.g. Arora et al. (2001), chapter 5) that license 
contracts include the transfer of complementary tacit knowledge embodied in the licensing 
firm. The license to use a certain technology may be useless without this transfer. This can 
serve as a hostage for the case that the licensee tries to invent around the licensed technology. 
 
For product innovations which are continuously improved (i.e., which trigger a stream of 
innovations) the incentive to license has been established by O’Donoghue, T., Scotchmer, S., 
and J. Thisse (1998). They study a “quality ladder” model, where one firm innovates 
necessarily using the preceding innovations which are obtained and patented by other firms. 
Without licenses no innovation will occur. The value of a license depends (among other 
things) on the intensity of product market competition. Very intense competition and a fast 
arrival of quite small innovations depress the value of a license and thus the incentive to 
innovate. Again mergers may help in this context if they do not lessen the availability of new 
ideas. 
 
The necessity of obtaining access to a patented innovation in order for another firm to develop 
another innovation may complicate the incentive issue in several aspects. Some “basic” 
innovations have the potential for several innovations in “applications” by different firms. 
Some “applied” innovations need not only access to one preceding patented innovation but to 
several. In order to secure the incentives to provide the basic innovation in the former case it 
is important to be able to collect license fees from the applied innovators (Green and 
Scotchmer (1995)). If the firm holding a patent on the basic innovation is not active on the 
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application market, the license fees and the propensity to license will be higher if the product 
market competition is less intense. The same will be the case for a firm that is active on both 
basic and applied innovation markets. Presumably the incentive to license will be reduced 
compared to a firm performing pure basic research. This will be particularly important if this 
firm fears that a rival may develop a higher quality product in the same market. Generally, the 
bargaining about license fees can be hampered by asymmetric information (Gallini and 
Wright (1990)). A firm seeking a license may have superior knowledge about the cost of 
developing an applied innovation as well as about the potential income generated by this 
innovation. This may inhibit licensing and provoke patent disputes. A merger between two 
firms one of which is active in the basic and the other being active in the applied segment may 
be beneficial to overcome this problem. On the other hand, it may induce a stronger incentive 
to deny licenses to the remaining rivals in the applied segment. 
 
If several licenses are needed to successfully engage in an applied innovation the issue of the 
“anticommons” may arise. This refers to the situation that several firms price their respective 
products (here licenses) higher if they do so non-cooperatively than if they cooperatively 
choose the prices (fees). This will be the case if the products are complements and this case is 
certainly relevant for the present context. One solution to this problem is the creation of a 
patent pool (Lerner and Tirole (2002)) in which several firms market their licenses jointly. 
This would obviously also save on transactions cost. Note that in this respect a merger may 
also be beneficial. 
 
Summary: The decision of a firm to license its innovation to a rival is shown to be positively 
affected by a low intensity of competition. It should be noted, however, that in such a context 
the incentive to innovate may be low in the first place. Therefore general conclusions to the 
effect that a low intensity of competition increases the incentives to innovate are not valid. 
The decision of a basic research firm to license its innovation to “applied” firms is shown to 
be favourably affected by a low intensity of competition. Again this is not convincing as the 
“escape the competition” effect is not accounted for in this literature. 
 
Overall the results pertaining to the effect of licensing on innovation are based on quite partial 
modelling strategies. It is therefore premature to derive empirically relevant hypotheses from 
this strand of literature. 
 
4.2 Spillovers in R&D 
 
The use of existing knowledge is a crucial aspect of the innovation process. Part of the 
knowledge which is accessible to a firm originates from the innovative endeavours of another 
firm. Legal protection of property rights is not perfect and strategic measures to prevent 
leakages of relevant information may not be perfect either. These information flows are called 
(knowledge) spillovers. There is an extensive literature dealing with the effects of these 
spillovers. The most cited contribution is d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). But there are 
many others, e.g. Amir (2000) or Kaiser (2001). All of these contributions focus on cost 
reducing innovations. The receiving firm obviously profits from such spillovers while the 
outgoing spillovers reduce the profit of the originating firm. These externalities dampen the 
incentive to engage in R&D. (As a by-product, it should be noted that R&D efforts are 
strategic substitutes for low spillovers while they are strategic complements for high 
spillovers in this literature. This is worth noticing as the patent race literature might have 
given the impression that innovation efforts are usually strategic complements.) The main 
theme of this literature is the incentive to form a research joint venture and its impact on the 
level of R&D. The principle findings are: 1) the incentive to form a joint venture exist for 
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sufficiently large spillovers and they are larger if the products are complements rather than 
substitutes; 2) a joint venture increases the level of R&D effort as the external effects due to 
spillovers can be internalized. As the case of complements can be interpreted to cover the case 
of vertically related firms, the first result would speak for more research agreements among 
vertically related firms than horizontally related firms. This accords well with the empirical 
findings. In this context, a merger would have similar effects on R&D efforts as a joint 
venture and would be positive for innovation.  
 
There exists also a large empirical literature on spillovers. However, only very few 
contributions study the effects of joint ventures not to speak of mergers. The research that 
deals with detecting spillovers and their importance provides support to both their existence 
and their importance (for a recent contribution see Bloom et al. (2005)). Work on spillovers 
and cooperative research agreements is due to Cassiman and Veugelers (1999). These authors 
distinguish incoming and outgoing spillovers and measure them based on Belgian data of the 
Community Innovation Survey. They find that this distinction matters (which is not 
considered in most of the theoretical literature). Firms with higher incoming spillovers and 
lower outgoing spillovers have an increased tendency to engage into cooperative research 
agreements. While their results are very important in their own right, they leave critical 
questions unanswered which could be helpful in the present context. It would have been 
valuable if the effect of cooperative research agreements on R&D could have been analyzed. 
This did not happen probably due to data availability. The main focus is also on agreements in 
a vertical chain or with research institutes and not on agreements with rivals. This focus is 
understandable as the vast majority of agreement cases (303) turn out to be such agreements. 
But it leaves the question of the impact of a horizontal merger without empirical guidance.  
 
Jirjahn and Kraft (2006) find in a study analyzing German establishment data that spillovers 
have a positive impact on incremental product innovations while they have no effect on 
drastic ones. Contrary to claims to be found in the literature under the notion of absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal (1989)) an impact of the own level of R&D is not supported 
by the results of these authors. Another finding is that research cooperation influences the 
measures of  product innovations positively.  
 
Summary: The empirical literature on knowledge spillovers to date has not found a definite 
answer to the question whether the net effect of spillovers is negative or positive on R&D 
incentives (e.g. Geroski (1995), Cohen (1995)). Both theory and empirical work sometimes 
speak for a positive and sometimes for a negative effect. Details again matter in an essential 
way. Therefore there are no final conclusions to be drawn neither on the question whether 
spillovers foster innovative output nor on the question whether mergers are formed for 
internalizing their external effects.  
 
4.3. Corporate Finance 
 
The view of corporate finance stresses agency costs which arise because managers of a 
publicly listed firm have superior information on the operation of the company compared to 
the shareholders. They are able to obtain an information rent by following their own 
preferences more than is in the interest of the owners and may hide their inability (Jensen 
(1986)). Mergers in the form of takeovers are seen as a disciplinary device. They provide an 
opportunity to replace current managers by more able ones. In addition mergers often increase 
the level of debt and reduce free cash flow. Therefore spending has to be cut, including 
spending on R&D. More specific to R&D is the fact that it is risky, that outsider suffer from 
asymmetric information about the potential of a R&D project, and that it creates asset 
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specificity. This implies that it is expensive to finance R&D by new debt. Indeed R&D is 
usually financed by internal equity. The asset specificity increases potential problems in debt 
renegotiations. From this follows that R&D spending will be reduced by a merger. If the 
disciplinary function of the merger works, cutting unproductive R&D projects is more 
probable than cutting promising ones. Hence the net effect on R&D outcome is not 
necessarily negative. 
 
Though there is not much empirical research on this topic there are some. Hall (1990) finds 
that R&D decreased after a merger which lead to higher leverage. This finding is supported 
by Hitt et al. (1991) and indirectly by Hitt et al. (1996).  
 
It should also be noted that the threat of a takeover may have an additional negative impact on 
the pre merger firms as well. This is important to recognize if pre merger and post merger 
performance is compared. The literature points to the fact that managers may abandon 
profitable long term projects and pursue short run projects with relatively safe and early 
returns (Laverty 1996)).  
 
Summary: Mergers as a disciplinary device decrease innovation inputs and but increase the 
efficiency of the innovation process in the merged entity. A merger leads to a focus on safe 
short term innovation projects in the pre merger firms.  
 
4.4 R&D management and other ability related aspects 
 
Mergers have the potential to optimize the use of the combined R&D capabilities of formerly 
independent companies. Some capabilities may be duplicative. A merger provides an 
opportunity to eliminate duplication. This aspect may imply lower R&D spending. On the 
other hand the possibility to arrange more profitable combinations out of the larger pool of 
R&D capabilities and financial means may increase the efficiency of the R&D process of a 
firm. Risks may be spread over a larger portfolio of projects. Research teams may be 
strengthened for particularly promising projects etc. These economies of scale in R&D will 
lead to more innovative output given the pre merger R&D inputs or the same R&D output can 
be obtained by less R&D input. There may also exist economies of scope in R&D. More 
applied segments (formerly associated to different firms) may use the same basic research 
facilities. This will lead to a more efficient R&D process. In summary, there should be a 
positive effect of a merger on the efficiency of the R&D process. However, the empirical 
results dealing with this issue are usually described as fragile (Cohen and Levin (1989)). 
 
The management literature has pointed at several weaknesses of the arguments just outlined. 
These criticisms may be summarized as the complete absence of transactions costs. Neither 
economies of scale nor economies of scope are available without costs. On an abstract level 
these are the costs of reorganisation. The potential synergies of combining knowledge which 
was external to the respective other party before the merger can only realize if this knowledge 
enters this other party. But there may be huge problem to which the literature refers to as the 
“not invented here” syndrome. Hence a merger must be accompanied with suitable 
organizational structures that induce an easy inflow of knowledge of the respective other 
party. Capron (1999) identifies resource redeployment as a major source of value creation in 
M&A. But this has to be properly managed as well. Redeployment not to speak of divesture 
may have a very detrimental effect on key inventors who may just leave (Ernst and Vitt 
(2000)). Although larger firms (post merger) have much to gain by new combinations of their 
knowledge pool this may imply drastic changes of routines. But this may mean that one 
partner has to accept the routines of the other. If these are in considerable conflict to the pre 
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merger routines of one party, the expected synergies may not arise. This possibility is 
particularly likely if the acquiring and the acquired knowledge base are quite dissimilar 
(Ahuja and Katila (2001)).  
 
While the arguments of the preceding paragraph referred to obstacles that might be implied by 
the subjective view of important people involved with R&D there is also some literature on 
the objective aspects that may evade such views. The central figure here is “strategic fitness” 
(Rumelt (1974)). In this view, strategic fitness is determined by the relatedness of the two 
parties. Similar product markets, similar production technologies or similar science-based 
research qualify for such relatedness (Rumelt (1974)). As the studies by Ahuja and Katila 
(2001) and by Cassiman et al. (2005) show, these dimensions are important in order to assess 
the impact of a merger on innovation. The latter study shows in addition that it is not just 
relatedness but whether a relationship is complementary or substitutive. 
 
Summary: A merger has the potential to reduce duplicated R&D efforts and to optimize the 
innovation process of the merged firms. It therefore may increase the efficiency of the 
innovation process. The related transaction costs are lower, if the technological fields and 
product markets are related. More specifically, complementary technological fields are 
conducive to increased innovation effort and efficiency. If the technological fields are 
substitutive, mergers among rivals reap lower gains in innovation efficiency and reduce 
innovation inputs to a larger degree. 
 
4.5 Technological opportunity and appropriability 
 
There is a consensus in the empirical literature that the extent of innovative activities differs 
widely across industries and also within industries across time (Cohen (1995)). These are 
attributed to differences in technological opportunity and appropriability in different 
industries. Sometimes a discovery opens up the opportunity to improve products or processes 
in technological fields that are “close” enough to this discovery. Hence industries can be 
expected to profit from such a discovery in differing degrees and hence have differing 
technological opportunities. Likewise patents can be seen as ways to appropriate the returns 
of R&D. But it has been known for a long time that there are industries where it is relatively 
easy to invent around a patent of a rival. This is reflected in the patenting behaviour in the 
respective industries. While for pharmaceutical and chemical sectors patenting is very 
important it is not for most other industries (e.g. Mansfield (1986)). Hence innovating firms 
have to use other means to appropriate their return on R&D (e.g. trade secrets). Which one 
they use depends cet. par. on the value they attach to a patent and therefore appropriability 
will be different in different industries. 
 
While this idea is straightforward it is much less obvious how to substantiate these claims 
empirically. Both opportunity and appropriability are extremely hard to measure. Sometimes 
opportunity is measured by the elasticity of unit cost with respect to R&D spending (e.g. 
Kukuk and Stadler (2005)). The simple idea behind this approach is that technological 
opportunity makes innovation easier thus decreasing R&D costs. In other work opportunity is 
retrospectively measured by citation of patents in a respective period (Trajtenberg (1990)). 
The latter possibility obviously is only possible if patents play an important role in the 
respective industry. There have been many more attempts to pin down technological 
opportunity empirically (Cohen (1995)) but often the proxies did not perform better than 
industry dummies. The reason for this unfortunate state can be seen in the many forms 
technological opportunity can take. Opportunity can be rooted in a scientific breakthrough 
which may be a good candidate for the biotech industry. It may be due to a change in import 
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restrictions (Gilbert (2006)) which brings new ideas from foreign firms. Or it may be due to 
suppliers or customers who may provide information on needs and ways to improve a 
product. In the latter case technological opportunity of one industry is fuelled by impacts from 
other industries. Hence, technological opportunity is not confined to the arena of one industry 
proper. It is therefore not surprising that many facets of this notion of technological 
opportunity are exemplified by case studies but that a consolidated view has not yet evolved 
(Cohen (1995)).  
 
With respect to appropriability the situation is similar. As noted above, appropriation does not 
only depend on whether patents protect against imitation in a specific industry or not. Firms 
have additional means to protect their R&D investment. They may use trade secrets or they 
may use first mover advantages and learning curve effects. They may also invest in assets 
which are complementary, necessary, and specific to the innovation such that the innovation 
cannot be used without these assets. Such assets like a specific sales and service team must 
often be created for the new product even if the firm could act non-strategically. But this 
obviously also helps in strategic contexts by securing returns by selling complementary 
services (Teece (1986)). Appropriability is of course also connected to the spillovers which 
possibly endangers it and also to problems with license agreements. All of this is obviously 
not easy to subsume in a unified way.  
 
Therefore we are back where we started: Industries are different in innovative activity. The 
notions of technological opportunity and appropriability suggest a unifying framework which 
may deliver on the conceptual level but does not help much on the empirical level. As so 
often above, we have to conclude that details matter and therefore in depth analysis of 
industry studies seem warranted. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
 
Innovation and M&A are two important forms of investment which follow partly their own 
logic respectively. But as different forms of investment are sometimes substitutes and 
sometimes complements it is not surprising that both are related to each other and should be 
studied together, especially if the impact of merger on innovation is the focus of analysis. As 
some firms merge, to boost their innovative performance, and some innovate to become an 
acquisition target, while other firms merge for entirely different reasons, it is not enough to 
look at the causal link from merger to innovation. In empirical analyses all types of mergers 
will typically occur and not controlling for the direction of causation leads to estimates which 
are hard to interpret. 
 
Therefore we have considered the innovation process and the M&A process in isolation in 
order to find fundamental forces shaping these processes and in order to find arguments which 
help to answer the question what may induce mergers and innovation respectively. If for 
example the study of the innovation process reveals that spillovers are very important in the 
industry in question this provides an incentive to merge (or to form a RJV). If, on the other 
hand, a merger is interesting because the new product of another firm would perfectly fit the 
product line of the firm under consideration, innovation of the other firm triggered the merger. 
Hence, looking at the innovation and merger incentives separately helps to disentangle the 
motivations for a merger. The two examples turn out to be in the logic of the innovation 
process. Of course, the merger may also follow a pure merger logic of efficiency (synergy) or 
market power reasons with consequences on the innovative activities which however 
constitute a by-product only. 
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The latter logic seems to underlie the early empirical literature on the impact of mergers on 
innovation. Given the multitude of motivations linking merger and innovation it is not 
surprising that these studies did not find robust results. It is remarkable that those more recent 
studies which try to control for such motivations by using propensity scores or endogenous 
switching models obtain more reliable estimates. 
 
The theory on mergers has pointed out the importance of the reactions by rivals quite early 
but probably more forcefully by the recent studies of Fridolfsson and co-authors. One benefit 
of this theoretical development can be seen in the insight how profitability measures using 
accounting data and rate of return data using stock prices are related to each other. The 
obvious message is that both measures do not have to point in the same direction. Another 
benefit is the insight that constructing a benchmark is not easy. Suppose that a merger induces 
the participating firms to cut back on their R&D expenditures and suppose that this induces 
the rivals to reduce R&D expenditures even more. Does the comparison of a rival with the 
merged firms provide meaningful information? In this case the merger would look good. But 
the impact on aggregate R&D would be negative. Obviously, this message could also be 
delivered by using any other individual matching concept for comparison. The effect may be 
mitigated, if instead a “median” type firm is used, if there is some heterogeneity of firms 
reactions and the matching firm (e.g. same propensity score) is more in line of the suggested 
reaction above compared to the median firm. It is interesting to note that the study of Betzer 
and Metzger (2006) reach similar conclusions as Gugler et al. (2003) despite of the fact that 
the first authors use a matching approach and the second a median firm benchmark. This may 
mean that the reaction of merger outsiders is similar. But this is no good news, as then both 
approaches are open to the above problem. It may on the other hand mean that strategic 
reactions do not play a large role and therefore the identity of the benchmark does not matter 
that much. This is an entirely open question. It would be of merit if both benchmark 
approaches would be applied to one dataset. 
 
The literature on the causes of mergers often focuses on the industry specific shocks which – 
in this view – trigger an adjustment which in turn can take the form of M&A if this is the 
most economical way to adjust. In general this approach begs the question, as the answer is 
delegated to the “most economical way”. However, if the shock is induced by a change in 
“technological regime” this might indeed speak for M&A. This view can be justified e.g. by 
views that stress the routine or the exploitation of a cash cow. In such a situation it may be 
profitable to jump on the changing technological regime train by M&A. The same jump 
within the company may invalidate valuable routines or cannibalize own technology or 
products. These shocks are also the triggering event in Boone (2006). In such cases firms 
confront constraints which they cannot economically deal with on their own. This may e.g. 
explain why pharmaceutical companies buy biotech firms. In such cases mergers are clearly 
caused by innovation (by others) and probably their own stock of patents does not help much 
in this respect. This is not to say that only technological shocks matter, but to stress that such 
shocks cause mergers rather than the other way around. In such a situation it is probable that 
the acquiring firm will improve the R&D potential of the innovating biotech firm. However 
this depends on the strength of the biotech firm. This firm may not be inclined to be acquired 
if strong. This fits well with the results of Danzon et al.  
 
The theoretical literature does not focus on the industry specific shocks (with the notable 
exception of Boone (2006), which however is on the consequences of such shocks). This 
literature focuses –if at all – on the common random influences on the outcome of a firm’s 
decision process. Investment projects – whether innovative ones or not – may fulfil their 
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promise or they may not. This is not the world of regimes switches or radical innovations. 
Unfortunately, the literature on this approach is not very precise in its predictions 
(Doraszelski (2003)) despite the fact that these contributions have to focus on quite restrictive 
circumstances. This renders an empirically relevant and reliable conclusion almost void - 
which should not imply that these types of analyses are useless – to the contrary. There are 
many conceivable other ways to model innovation and mergers. And it is not clear what the 
better way would be. This stresses the value of Doraszelski’s contribution as the first viable 
attempt.  
 
If the Ericson-Pakes model is considered as a model for innovation its merger appendix in 
Doraszelski (the largest firms may merge others not) is only one possible version. In a way it 
is consistent with the innovation theory claiming that the level of output is an incentive for 
innovation. On average it is a stylized fact that acquiring firms are big, but there are also 
exceptions which may however trigger large transactions volumes.  
 
In short: the stochastic nature of the causes of mergers is not fully understood. For the major 
shocks like radical innovations or technology regime switches there is no remedy in sight. 
Otherwise they may not be radical. The usual up and downs of the discovery and development 
process are probably the more relevant description of the R&D process anyway. This forms 
the background for models like those of Ericson and Pakes or Doraszelski. Unfortunately, it is 
hard to see robust predictions form these models which is partly due to the numerical methods 
these authors have to use.  
 
There are also deficits of the innovation literature. It its true that some fundamental forces 
have been identified. Among them are the efficiency effect (escape the competition), the 
replacement effect (profit effect), and the knowledge effect. These help structure the ideas 
about which firm would succeed in a race to an innovation. But it does not incorporate the full 
wealth of causes. Indeed the analysis of Hörner speaks for some aspects not accounted for by 
these considerations. This renders it hard to pin down characteristics of firms and of 
circumstances which may be inducements for innovation in general: everything depends on 
the whole trajectory of events. Change one aspect and the innovative outcome is different. 
This in itself is no deficit as this situation just mirrors the acknowledgement of the fact that 
details matter. But so far, they matter on the theoretical level. It is not clear whether all these 
contingencies really matter in practice. It would be very helpful to find out which aspects are 
particularly important for the incentives of merger candidates. The incentive to catch up or to 
leap frog against the incentive to gain an advantage that cannot be leap froged is not decided 
on the empirical front, neither without the consideration of mergers nor with such 
considerations.  
 
In general, empirical studies often seem far removed from possible theoretical underpinnings. 
The replacement effect and the efficiency effect are known for at least 20 years. The intuition 
behind them is easy to grasp. Nevertheless the cited studies of Czarnitzki and Kraft are two of 
the very few studies which try to use this theoretical construct and are successful at it. It 
would be very helpful to have more of such studies. 
 
The distinction of process and product innovation matters in theory and should therefore be 
distinguished in empirical work as well (if possible). The correlation analysis of Tang speaks 
for this from an empirical point of view. Other empirical studies have also found that the logic 
for both types of innovation is different. Among other things, size effects are to be expected 
from theoretical reasoning as more relevant for process innovations than for product 
innovations and this has found empirical support in some studies. As size is an important 
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aspect of mergers this speaks for the importance of this distinction. But to date most empirical 
studies do not account for that distinction.  
 
Theory has also revealed that the intensity of competition does not have an unambiguous 
impact on innovation. Among other things this depends on the measure of intensity of 
competition. More importantly some indicators measure very different aspects of the intensity 
of competition (number of rivals versus substitutability). A merger will usually change the 
number of competitors but not the degree of substitutability. It would therefore be advisable to 
ponder the reasons to introduce a specific measure rather than another in an empirical 
investigation of the product competition/innovation link. From reading the respective 
literature this advice seems justified. 
 
Theory necessarily abstracts from many aspects of a practical issue. It is usually hoped that 
the left out details are not relevant for the major question under scrutiny. With respect to 
innovation the only modelling strategy builds on the profit motive of a firm. Of course, this 
neglects at least two dimensions. First, many engineers and scientists are driven by the motive 
to find something new. They are just fascinated by cracking hard problems. Sometimes there 
is no need to have another person supporting such endeavours, because the motivation is 
completely intrinsic. In other cases the respect of a community of fellow scientists, engineers 
or inventors is surpassing the profit motive by far. Hence, empirical work may pick up some 
of these motivations which are not related to the profit motive. I would not know of studies 
which would employ the discrepancy of the profit motive prediction and the actual 
performance to shed light on the importance of this potential influence. But they would be 
helpful in the merger/innovation context as a merger could be predicted to have only minor 
impacts on innovation, if the researchers are intrinsically motivated and therefore just do 
“their thing”.  
 
Second, the theory on which this review was focussed did not consider where the capability 
for innovation came from. Present day growth theory stresses the importance of human 
capital. From this perspective it is clear that notions such as technological opportunity are also 
dependent on human capital related to such a technological opportunity. It is obvious that 
governmental action in the realms of higher education then can make a marked difference. 
Usually such influences can only be detected in the long run. But if, as in some empirical 
studies, different studies with potentially different governmental programs towards specific 
skills are compared among different countries such differences can be expected to be very 
important. In our present context it may e.g. trigger a merger of a domestic firm with a foreign 
firm because this provides access to relevantly trained R&D personnel.  
 
This review has for its most part dwelled on issues of the M&A process and of the innovation 
process, separately and jointly. It has been argued that theoretical and econometric work have 
not exploited synergy effects between them to a satisfactory extent. Competition economists 
are quite hesitant to clear mergers, but it seems compelling from the arguments so far that 
they would not oppose if both parts of economics would at least form a RJV on this topic. 
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